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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Rule 17(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that: 
 
A minor or an incompetent person who does not have 
a duly appointed representative may sue by a next 
friend or by a guardian ad litem.  The court must 
appoint a guardian ad litem – or issue another 
appropriate order – to protect a minor or incompetent 
person who is unrepresented in an action. 
 
(emphasis supplied). 
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 The Advisory Committee Notes do not elaborate on 
the requirement of the emphasized language above and there 
is but a paucity of reported decisions interpreting the 
provision.  Although the language of the Rule makes the 
obligation mandatory, see Berrios v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 
564 F.3d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2009), there is no suggestion 
which factors should trigger the district court’s duty of 
inquiry as to whether the individual at issue is incompetent.  
As a result, responsibility for Rule 17 appears generally to be 
left to the discretion of the district courts. 
 
This consolidated appeal arises from two cases in 
which prisoners, proceeding pro se, sought damages from 
prison officials.  The appeal calls on the court to decide 
whether the District Courts erred in failing to sua sponte 
inquire whether Powell or Hartmann were incompetent under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2) or in declining to 
appoint counsel or some representative for them. 
 
I. 
 
 Kevin Powell, a Pennsylvania state prisoner 
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed suit in the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania in 2007 pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. John Symons, his treating 
physician at SCI-Rockview.  Powell asserts an Eighth 
Amendment claim that Dr. Symons was deliberately 
indifferent to his medical needs.  The District Court denied 
Dr. Symons’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
Dr. Symons subsequently filed a motion for summary 
judgment.   
 
Powell filed a series of motions for extensions of time 
and for counsel.  The  Magistrate Judge, exercising his 
authority to resolve non-dispositive pre-trial motions, granted 
five of Powell’s requests for extensions of time to file a 
response and denied one request as moot.  In the last order 
extending Powell’s time to respond, the Magistrate Judge 
directed him to respond by February 26, 2010 and informed 
Powell that no further extensions would be granted.  Powell’s 
seventh motion for an extension of time to respond to Dr. 
Symons’ motion for summary judgment explained that the 
District Court presiding over his criminal proceeding had 
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ordered him to a psychiatric facility for four months and he 
was there without his personal property.  The Magistrate 
Judge denied the motion and reminded Powell that no further 
extensions would be granted.  Powell never filed a response 
to the motion for summary judgment. 
 
 Powell’s ten motions for counsel cited his rudimentary 
education and his difficulties obtaining legal assistance while 
in prison.  The Magistrate Judge denied each of Powell’s 
motions for counsel.  In so doing, the Magistrate Judge wrote 
that he assumed Powell’s claim to have potential merit and 
that several of the relevant factors, including Powell’s 
education level and the need for expert testimony, weighed in 
favor of appointing counsel.  Although the Magistrate Judge 
stated that he preferred to appoint counsel, he denied counsel 
primarily on the ground that, in his experience, it is difficult 
to find counsel willing to represent prisoners in civil rights 
cases.   
 
 At about the same time as Powell’s civil proceeding, 
he was charged in a criminal proceeding in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania for issuing threats against the 
President and mailing threatening communications in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 871 and 876(c), respectively.1
 
  
Powell, who was represented in the criminal case by 
appointed counsel, pleaded guilty to those charges in January 
2009.  However, prior to sentencing, the District Court 
appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. Stefan Kruszewski, to examine 
Powell and prepare a written report of his findings.   
Dr. Kruszewski, a graduate of Harvard Medical 
School, has written and spoken extensively about psychiatric 
issues.  He has had at least 30 years of clinical practice 
experience in which he treated several thousand patients with 
a wide variety of psychiatric and neuropsychiatric conditions.  
He prepared an extensive report for the criminal case, setting 
forth details of his examination.  Dr. Kruszewski concluded 
that Powell met the accepted diagnosis of delusional disorder, 
mixed subtypes, a diagnosis based on Powell’s “repeated 
pattern of physical complaints without medical findings to 
                                              
1   He subsequently explained that he sent those threats so 
he would be transferred to federal prison.   
6 
 
support them, the somatic elements of his reported ‘torture’ 
and his simultaneously persistent and episodic refusal of 
medication.”  S.A. at 42.  The report continued, “[r]egardless 
of the cause of his symptoms and the origins of his delusional 
disorder, some of his conduct is beyond his willful control.  
That is the nature of an isolated psychotic system of relatively 
fixed delusional beliefs.”  Id. 
 
 Dr. Kruszewski wrote that Powell’s “potential to act 
out violently against others, including those he named in his 
letters, is small,” in part because he has “somewhat limited 
cognitive abilities.”  S.A. at 42.  Dr. Kruszewski further noted 
that “there is a great deal of doubt that he had the capacity to 
form the criminal intent to harm because he has a persistent 
serious mental illness that chronically alters his reality and his 
ability to conduct himself within the confines of the law,” and 
that “we can expect his delusional symptoms to wax and 
wane.”  Id.  Notwithstanding this diagnosis, Dr. Kruszewski 
also found that “[a]lthough his testable fund of information 
was limited in certain ways . . . , Mr. Powell was able to 
satisfy my concern that he was able to understand the legal 
processes and cooperate with them to the best of his ability.”  
S.A. at 32.   
 
After reading and absorbing Dr. Kruszewski’s 
diagnosis, the District Court acknowledged that Powell “may 
be suffering from a mental disease or defect that has rendered 
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he was previously 
unable to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.”  S.A. at 
49.  However, the Court determined that Dr. Kruszewski’s 
report did not provide the Court with sufficient information 
regarding Powell’s competency when he pleaded guilty and 
ordered that Powell be committed to federal custody for 
further psychiatric evaluation.   
 
In October 2009, on the basis of an additional 
psychiatric evaluation, the Court granted the motion of 
Powell’s defense counsel to withdraw his guilty plea and 
enter a plea of not guilty to the charges in the indictment.  
The Court then issued an order finding that Powell “is 
presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering 
him mentally incompetent to understand the nature and the 
consequences of the proceedings now against him.”  S.A. at 
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52.  Subsequently, the U.S. Attorney requested dismissal of 
the indictment, which the Court granted in July 2010. 
 
Turning to the civil case, the Magistrate Judge, in his 
last two orders denying counsel, noted the criminal court’s 
rulings and his own concerns about Powell’s mental 
competence.  In an order entered August 2009, the Magistrate 
Judge concluded that although “[Powell’s] mental capacity 
could affect his ability to present his case in a clear and 
concise manner, he has thus far been able to preserve his 
interests by engaging in communication with the court.  As 
evident in the documents that [Powell] has already filed with 
the court, it is clear that [Powell] is literate and more than 
capable of communicating effectively.”  J.A. at 22.  In a later 
order entered in March 2010, the Magistrate Judge 
acknowledged that since his last order Powell had been 
adjudicated mentally incompetent in the criminal proceeding.  
The Magistrate Judge stated that “[t]he fact that [Powell] has 
been found incompetent, of course, weighs in favor of 
appointing counsel.”  J.A. at 27.  He once again denied the 
motion, however, based on his conclusion that “it is unlikely 
that counsel could be found to represent [Powell].”  J.A. at 
28.  The Magistrate Judge did not discuss his obligations 
under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   
 
The same day, the Magistrate Judge issued a report 
and recommendation noting that Powell had not filed a 
response to the motion for summary judgment, but he 
recommended granting it on the merits because Dr. Symons 
“presented evidence that [Powell] received extensive medical 
care and treatment including examinations, medications, lab 
tests, chest x-rays and an electrocardiogram.”  J.A. at 38.  The 
Magistrate Judge noted that Powell “has not presented any 
evidence that [Dr. Symons] was deliberately indifferent to his 
medical needs or any evidence that [Dr. Symons’] actions or 
inactions caused him harm.”  J.A. at 39.  The District Court 
adopted the recommendation in full.  Powell appeals.2
                                              
2 Because Powell asserts a claim under the Eighth 
Amendment and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the District 
Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction over his appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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We review for abuse of discretion both a district 
court’s decision to appoint a guardian ad litem under Rule 
17(c) as well as its decision to deny counsel to an indigent 
civil litigant.3
                                                                                                     
We reject Dr. Symons’ argument that, because Powell 
cited the wrong order in his Notice of Appeal, this court is 
without jurisdiction over Powell’s appeal.  Notices of appeal, 
especially those filed pro se, are liberally construed, and we 
can exercise jurisdiction over orders not specified in a notice 
of appeal if “(1) there is a connection between the specified 
and unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the 
unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is 
not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.”  
Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Those 
requirements are met here.  In his Notice of Appeal, Powell 
listed the date of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation rather than the final order of the District 
Court.  However, those two documents are closely related, as 
Dr. Symons concedes.  Moreover, Powell’s intent is clearly to 
appeal the final order adopting the Report and 
Recommendation as this is the only means of obtaining relief 
from the summary judgment decision he challenges.  
Moreover, Dr. Symons has had a full opportunity to brief all 
the issues and has not been prejudiced by Powell’s error.   
  See Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 
498 (3d Cir. 2002) (appointment of counsel); Gardner ex rel. 
Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 1989) (Rule 
17(c)).  We exercise plenary review of a district court’s grant 
 
3 Powell did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s orders 
denying his motions for counsel, as required by Middle 
District of Pennsylvania Rule 72.2.  “Normally, a party who 
fails to object before the district court to a magistrate judge’s 
ruling on a non-dispositive pretrial matter waives that 
objection on appeal.” Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153-54 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1993).  However, in light of Powell’s pro se 
status and the fact that the Magistrate Judge’s orders did not 
notify Powell that he risked waiving his appellate rights by 
failing to object, this court has discretion to reach the issue.  
See Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 364-65 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Tabron, 6 F.3d at 153 n.2. 
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of summary judgment, and apply the same standard as the 
district court.  See Tri-M Group, LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 
415 (3d Cir. 2011); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
 
II. 
 
 This court consolidated the appeals filed by Powell 
and Detlef Hartmann (whose appeal raises similar issues of 
the obligation of district courts under Federal Rule 17(c)) and 
appointed amicus counsel to address the following: (1) 
whether, in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), the 
District Courts should have sua sponte questioned the 
competence of Powell and Hartmann; (2) if so, what actions 
the Courts should have taken in that regard; and (3) whether 
the District Courts abused their discretion in denying the 
motions for appointment of counsel.4
   
 
 Federal courts encounter the issue of appointment of 
counsel more frequently in civil cases under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e), but only rarely consider the issue of appointment of 
a guardian ad litem under Rule 17(c).   
 
As noted at the outset of the opinion, it is the federal 
district court’s obligation to issue an appropriate order “to 
protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented 
in an action.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2).  This court has yet to 
set forth the factors that warrant sua sponte inquiry into a 
litigant’s capacity to sue or be sued under Rule 17(c) and the 
Rule itself does not offer any commentary.  However, the 
Second Circuit has set forth a well-reasoned standard that has 
been adopted elsewhere and that we adopt under the 
circumstances here.  In Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care 
Center, 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2003), that Court 
concluded that a district court need not inquire sua sponte 
into a pro se plaintiff’s mental competence based on a 
litigant’s bizarre behavior alone, even if such behavior may 
suggest mental incapacity.  That is an important limiting 
factor as to the application of Rule 17.  The federal courts are 
                                              
4 We express our appreciation to counsel for amici Karen 
Daly and Stephen McConnell and their law firm, Dechert 
LLP, for undertaking this responsibility.  It is in the best 
tradition of the Philadelphia bar. 
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flooded with pro se litigants with fanciful notions of their 
rights and deprivations.  We cannot expect district judges to 
do any more than undertake a duty of inquiry as to whether 
there may be a viable basis to invoke Rule 17.  That duty of 
inquiry involves a determination of whether there is verifiable 
evidence of incompetence.  In the context of unrepresented 
litigants proceeding in forma pauperis, this inquiry would 
usually occur after the preliminary merits screening under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A or 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 
 
With regard to the question of whether there is 
verifiable evidence of incompetence, the Ferrelli Court 
concluded that a district court would likely abuse its 
discretion if it failed to consider whether Rule 17(c) applied 
“[i]f a court were presented with evidence from an 
appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency 
indicating that the party had been adjudicated incompetent, or 
if the court received verifiable evidence from a mental health 
professional demonstrating that the party is being or has been 
treated for mental illness of the type that would render him or 
her legally incompetent.”  Id.  We also agree with the Fourth 
Circuit in Hudnall v. Sellner, 800 F.2d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 
1986), that bizarre behavior alone is insufficient to trigger a 
mandatory inquiry into a litigant’s competency but “if there 
has been a legal adjudication of incompetence and that is 
brought to the court’s attention, the Rule’s provision is 
brought into play.”  The Ferrelli Court noted that it was 
“mindful of the need to protect the rights of the mentally 
incompetent,” but at the same time “in light of the volume of 
pro se filings in [the Second] Circuit,” it could not “disregard 
the potential burden on court administration associated with 
conducting frequent inquiries into pro se litigants’ mental 
competency.”  323 F.3d at 201.  We share the same concern.  
It follows that the district court must satisfy its duty of inquiry 
before it proceeds to determine if Rule 17 applies. 
 
A court is not required to conduct a sua sponte 
determination whether an unrepresented litigant is 
incompetent unless there is some verifiable evidence of 
incompetence.  However, once the duty of inquiry is satisfied, 
a court may not weigh the merits of claims beyond the § 
1915A or § 1915(e)(2) screening if applicable.  Cf. Berrios v. 
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 
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Gardner, 874 F.2d at 141) (“Because [the plaintiff, a severely 
mentally retarded teenager] was without a representative 
when the court dismissed her claims, and was otherwise 
unprotected, the court was without authority to reach the 
merits of those claims.”); cf. also Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. 
Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77, 94 n.15 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing 
Adelman ex rel. Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986, 989 (5th 
Cir. 1984), for the proposition that “the district court 
improperly dismissed the case without first determining 
whether the incompetent’s interests were adequately 
represented”).5
 
   
 A.  Kevin Powell 
 
                                              
5 In a not dissimilar context, this court has previously had 
occasion to consider the standard for appointment of counsel 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a statute that “gives district courts 
broad discretion to request an attorney to represent an 
indigent civil litigant.”  Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  In Tabron, we held that, after considering the 
merits of a plaintiff’s claim as a threshold matter, a district 
court should consider additional factors that bear on the need 
for appointed counsel including: (1) plaintiff’s ability to 
present his case; (2) the difficulty of the legal issues; (3) the 
degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and 
plaintiff’s ability to pursue investigation; (4) plaintiff’s 
capacity to retain counsel on his own behalf; (5) the extent to 
which the case will turn on credibility determinations; and (6) 
whether the case will require testimony from an expert 
witness.  Id. at 155-57; Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 
492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002).  Powell’s complaint easily met the 
threshold issue of the merits of the putative claim because the 
District Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, 
acknowledging that Powell’s claim had sufficient merit to 
proceed.  Nonetheless, the District Court denied Powell’s 
request for counsel noting the scarcity of attorneys willing to 
take prisoner civil rights cases pro bono.  We recognized that 
problem in Tabron, but we declined to make that issue 
determinative of appointment of counsel, 6 F.3d at 157, and 
we decline to do so here as well.  
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It appears that the District Court in Powell’s case 
failed to consider whether Rule 17(c) applied, an issue raised 
first by this court rather than by anyone on Powell’s behalf, or 
by the defendant.  Most important, Powell had been 
adjudicated incompetent in the simultaneous criminal 
proceeding, and the Magistrate Judge was on notice of that 
adjudication.  Under Pennsylvania law, the applicable law of 
Powell’s domicile, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(1), once a person 
is adjudicated incompetent, s/he is deemed incompetent “for 
all purposes until, by court order, the status of incompetency 
is lifted.”  Syno v. Syno, 594 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1991) (citing 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5517 and Pa. R. Civ. 
P. 2051).6
 
  
Under ordinary circumstances, a determination as to 
whether Rule 17 applies is to be made in the first instance by 
the trial court.  Here, however, the psychiatric report is so 
thorough as to Powell’s incapacity for purposes of the 
criminal case and the Court’s finding of incapacity so amply 
supported in the record, that we conclude that it was an abuse 
of discretion not to enter an order appointing an appropriate 
representative.  There is nothing to show that the Magistrate 
Judge sought counsel, made inquiry of the bar associations, or 
inquired as to whether law schools that may have clinical 
programs or senior centers with social workers would be 
willing to undertake the necessary representation.   
 
It appears that in Powell’s case it may not be difficult 
to undertake this task.  Dr. Symons’ brief suggests that there 
is ample evidence that Powell’s condition was seriously 
considered, but under the test we adopt from Ferrelli, we may 
not assume his competence in the face of evidence to the 
contrary.  Therefore, we will reverse and remand with 
directions to the District Court to appoint a representative or 
counsel to proceed with the case.  
                                              
6 Pennsylvania defines an “incapacitated person” as “an 
adult whose ability to receive and evaluate information 
effectively and communicate decisions in any way is 
impaired to such a significant extent that the person is 
partially or totally unable to manage financial resources or to 
meet the essential requirements for physical health and 
safety.” Pa. R. Civ. P. 2051.   
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B.  Detlef Hartmann 
 
In 2006, while incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn 
Correctional Center (“Vaughn”), Detlef Hartmann filed a pro 
se suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District of Delaware 
against the warden and members of the prison medical staff, 
among others.7
 
  Hartmann was granted leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis.   
Hartmann’s initial complaint listed twenty defendants 
and made a variety of claims concerning the circumstances of 
his incarceration, including the denial of medical services and 
inadequate access to legal materials.  After screening under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A and a series of amendments to 
the complaint, the District Court permitted Hartmann to 
proceed with his claims against Ihuoma Chuks, an employee 
of Correctional Medical Services, Inc., the contractor 
responsible for healthcare at Vaughn; Thomas Carroll, then 
warden of Vaughn; and David Pierce, then deputy warden of 
Vaughn.  Hartmann alleged that Chuks, Carroll, and Pierce 
were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.  
Specifically, Hartmann claimed that he was denied treatment 
for throat pain and thyroid disease and that, although he was 
referred to an endocrinologist, prison officials never 
transported him to one.  Hartmann’s other claims and other 
named defendants were dismissed for various reasons, 
including failure to serve, and are not the subject of this 
appeal.   
 
Defendants Carroll and Pierce filed a motion to 
dismiss for insufficiency of process, which was denied by the 
District Court.  Carroll subsequently served a set of 
interrogatories on Hartmann.  Hartmann’s response to those 
interrogatories, while somewhat discursive, demonstrated an 
impressive ability to organize his points, make rational 
arguments, and cite supporting legal authority.   
 
During the course of this litigation, Hartmann also 
filed eight motions seeking appointment of counsel.  Those 
motions listed a variety of reasons why counsel was 
necessary, including Hartmann’s limited access to legal 
                                              
7 Hartmann was released from custody in January 2009.   
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materials and unspecified “mental disabilities.”  J.A. at 217, 
246.  Attached to his final request for counsel, Hartmann filed 
a one-paragraph letter from Dr. Jeanette Zaimes, a 
psychiatrist, that states:  
 
To Whom It May Concern:  Mr. Detlef Hartmann is 
under my care for Major Depression and Attention 
Deficit Disorder.  I do not feel he is competent at this 
time to represent himself in court.  I would recommend 
that he be given a public defender, if at all possible. 
 
J.A. at 389.  There is no other medical evidence of 
Hartmann’s mental health in the record. 
 
The District Court denied each of Hartmann’s requests 
for counsel, repeatedly finding that Hartmann was capable of 
presenting his own case.  In its order denying Hartmann’s 
final request for counsel, the Court acknowledged Dr. 
Zaimes’ letter, but found that “[u]pon consideration of the 
record, the court is not persuaded that appointment of counsel 
is warranted at this time.  The court has thoroughly reviewed 
the file and, at every turn, [Hartmann] has ably represented 
himself.  At this juncture of the case, there is no evidence that 
prejudice will result in the absence of counsel.”  J.A. at 89.  
However, the Court denied the motion without prejudice, to 
be renewed should any of his claims survive summary 
judgment.  As in Powell’s case, the District Court did not 
explicitly discuss its Rule 17 obligations. 
 
Thereafter, in April 2010, Chuks, Carroll, and Pierce 
moved for summary judgment, which the District Court 
granted.  The Court concluded that the defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment because there was insufficient 
evidence that “the defendants had any personal involvement 
in the alleged constitutional violations.”  J.A. at 99.  In 
addition, the Court found that the record demonstrated that 
Hartmann received medical care for his throat and thyroid 
conditions and that the evidence could not support a finding 
of deliberate indifference.  In the same order the District 
Court dismissed, without prejudice, Hartmann’s claims 
15 
 
against two other defendants for failure to effect service.8
 
  
Hartmann appeals this final order.   
Under the rule we adopt in this case, the letter from Dr. 
Zaimes sufficed to put the district court on notice that 
Hartmann was possibly incompetent.  When confronted with 
verifiable evidence from a mental health professional of an 
unrepresented litigant’s incompetence, the district court has 
an obligation, pursuant to Rule 17, to inquire into the 
litigant’s competency.  But the letter from Dr. Zaimes is 
hardly overwhelming evidence of incompetency.  It amounts 
to little more than a conclusory statement that Hartmann is 
incompetent, and it fails to specify what assessments Dr. 
Zaimes performed to arrive at that conclusion.  It is thus quite 
unlike the careful and detailed analysis provided by Dr. 
Kruszewski as to Kevin Powell.   
 
Under the circumstances, the evidence of 
incompetency is not so strong that we may conclude that the 
district court necessarily should have found Hartmann to be 
incompetent and should have appointed a guardian or counsel 
to represent his interests.  Instead, we hold only that the 
district court abused its discretion in failing to at least 
consider the possible application of Rule 17(c).  We are 
                                              
8 It is not clear whether Hartmann intends to challenge the 
dismissal of his claims against Paul Howard and Edward 
Johnson on appeal.  However, to the extent that Hartmann 
challenges that ruling, we will affirm.  The District Court 
waited over two years after Hartmann filed his revised 
amended complaint before dismissing Hartmann’s claims 
against Howard and Johnson for failure to serve.  Hartmann 
was given an opportunity to state good cause for the delay, 
but he failed to do so.  Where a plaintiff fails without good 
cause to effect service on a defendant within 120 days of the 
filing of a complaint, a district court does not abuse its 
discretion by dismissing the action against that defendant 
without prejudice.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Rance v. 
Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286-87 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (explaining that an incarcerated pro se plaintiff is 
entitled to rely on service by the U.S. Marshals, but only after 
the plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify the 
defendants).   
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sensitive to the potential burden imposed by such a holding 
on the district courts.  It might be that some evidence of 
incompetence (such as, perhaps, Dr. Zaimes’s letter) is 
sufficiently unpersuasive as to be rebutted by other evidence 
in the record, or by the district court’s own experience with 
an unrepresented litigant, without the need for a full blown 
hearing.  But there ought to have been at least some 
consideration of the Rule under these circumstances.  We 
shall remand for the district court to determine, in its 
discretion, whether Hartmann is competent within the 
meaning of Rule 17(c), as well as the degree and form of 
process required to answer that question.  If he is determined 
to be incompetent and remains unrepresented, Rule 17(c) 
requires that a guardian be appointed or some other remedial 
step taken. 9
 
 
III. 
 
The fact that we remand does not suggest that either 
District Judge erred in the procedure each followed.  Each 
Judge was conscientious in his or her review.  We had not 
previously turned our attention, and therefore theirs, to Rule 
17.  Only after the issue of the propriety of appointing a 
representative on behalf of each of these plaintiffs is 
                                              
9 In denying Hartmann’s motions for appointment of 
counsel, the District Court stated that appointment of counsel 
is warranted “only ‘upon a showing of special circumstances 
indicating the likelihood of substantial prejudice to [plaintiff] 
resulting from [plaintiff’s] probable inability without such 
assistance to present the facts and legal issues to the court in a 
complex but arguably meritorious case.’”  J.A. at 88-89 
(quoting Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.3d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 
1984)).  We note, however, that in Tabron this court 
repudiated the “special circumstances” requirement.  See 6 
F.3d at 155.  In light of that fact we will remand for the 
District Court to reconsider the request for counsel in addition 
to the Rule 17(c) issue. 
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considered can we be satisfied that the process required by 
Rule 17 has been satisfied.10
 
 
  
                                              
10  We will respectfully send a copy of this opinion to the 
chairperson of the Advisory Committee to call to its attention 
the paucity of comments on Rule 17. 
